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Abstract 
This paper discusses the potential benefits of monetary policy rules for transition 
economies [TEs]. It is argued that the nominal interest rate may fail to be the appropriate 
instrument in such rules. One reason is the amount of non-calculable political and 
economic risk inherent in TEs. These risks lead to a significant and volatile ambiguity 
premium in the interest rate over and above the normal risk premium, which makes the 
real equilibrium interest rate difficult to measure. Therefore, a monetary aggregate like 
the money base may be more appropriate as the instrument for monetary policy rules in 
TEs. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The use of monetary policy rules to evaluate and describe central bank policy actions has 
been growing rapidly. Much of the research on policy rules has focused on economies 
with highly developed asset markets, especially markets for debt and foreign exchange. 
 
The main type of monetary policy rule suggested in the early 1990s was the Taylor rule, 
which was originally designed for the USA, but also worked well in other developed 
economies. The main research tool used to design that rule was a model of seven large 
economies. Each economy was assumed to have both a fully developed long term bond 
market and a foreign exchange market with a high degree of capital mobility. 
 
The Taylor rule is defined by 
 
 r = r* + β(π-π*)+ γ(Y-Y*) 
 
where  
 r  denotes the actual nominal short term interest rate 
 r* denotes the equilibrium nominal short term interest rate 
 π denotes the actual rate of inflation 
 π* denotes the equilibrium rate of inflation 
 Y denotes the actual output and 
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 Y* denotes the capacity output. 
 
A question that arises is if the Taylor rule is also a useful guide for monetary policy in 
transition economies. It should be noted that the Taylor rule does not take direct account 
of shocks, which one would expect to occur more prominently in transition economies 
than in developed economies. Still, Taylor rules have many of the same advantages in 
transition economies as they have in developed countries. In particular, for transition 
economies that do not choose a policy of a “permanently” fixed exchange rate (perhaps 
through a currency board or through a common currency, i.e. dollarization), a sound 
monetary policy should be based on the trinity of a flexible exchange rate, an inflation 
target, and a monetary policy rule. But it will be necessary to change some of the features 
of the typical kind of policy rule that is recommended for countries with more developed 
financial markets. 
 
In particular, when considering monetary policy rules for transition economies, the 
following major issues arise: 
1. Which instruments should be included in the monetary policy rule? 
2. What specific rule should be followed? 
3. What is the role of the exchange rate in a monetary policy rule? 
4. What is the role of uncertainty and ambiguity? 
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 2. Monetary Policy Rules 
 
Before addressing these issues in more detail, we state what precisely we mean by a 
monetary policy rule. In the context of our analysis, a monetary policy rule is understood 
to be a contingency plan that specifies clearly the cases under which a central bank 
should change the instruments of monetary policy. E.g. the Taylor rule describes the 
change in the instruments that would accompany an increase in inflation or in real GDP 
relative to potential GDP. To be credible, a policy rule should be used for many periods 
in the future. 
 
In research on policy rules, the instrument has been a short term overnight interest rate. 
But other instruments in a policy rule could be the money base, or some other monetary 
aggregate. In his seminal paper Taylor (1979), for instance, uses the money supply as the 
instrument. McCallum (1988) sees advantages of policy rules with a monetary aggregate 
as the instrument and the famous Friedman growth rate rule also has a monetary 
aggregate as the instrument. Since the mid 1980s, however, it was found that the interest 
rate is a more practical instrument in policy rules. 
 
Thus, one may want to consider a modified Taylor rule to take these considerations into 
account. A central bank may want to implement a general interest rate rule in order to 
achieve specific policy objectives. Such rule may take the following form: 
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 rt = r* + αrt-1 + β(πt-π*) + γ(Y-Y*) + δ (et-et-1) + εmt 
 
where t is the time index, et denotes the exchange rate and εmt denotes a domestic 
monetary policy shock. 
 
More generally, one may want to consider three special cases of monetary policy rules. 
They are rules that operate at the moment of monetary policy shocks and, therefore, are 
feedback rules for monetary policy. In particular, we mention the inflation targeting rule, 
the Taylor rule and the managed exchange rate rule. These rules are considered in the 
context of a central bank that is engaged in interest rate smoothing, but of course, a 
similar approach can be applied for the smoothing of other instruments as, e.g. the 
exchange rate. 
 
The inflation targeting rule is 
 
 rt = ρrrt-1 + (1-ρr)β(πt-π*) + εmt
 
where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter. 
 
The Taylor rule extends the inflation targeting rule by adding the deviation of output 
from its capacity: 
 
 rt = ρrrt-1 + (1-ρr)β(πt-π*) + (1-ρr)γ(Yt-Y*) + εmt
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 The managed exchange rate rule, finally, is obtained by adding a reaction to the 
devaluation of the exchange rate, as exchange rate volatility is a cause for worry to many 
countries. The rule is 
 
 rt = ρrrt-1 + (1-ρr)β(πt-π*) + (1-ρr)γ(Y-Y*) + (1-ρr)δ(et-et-1) + εmt
 
The actual short term interest rate as set by the central bank may, however, at times 
deviate from the one indicated by the appropriate policy rule, as some special factors of 
the policy environment cannot be included in the rule. Liquidity crises in financial 
markets will usually require such discretion. The 1987 stock market crash in the USA is 
one such example. Before this crash, the Fed was increasing the short term interest rate, 
apparently because inflation and the output gap were increasing. But when liquidity 
became a concern after the crash, the Fed lowered the interest rate and thereby provided 
more liquidity. Such discretionary actions are, of course, relative to the benchmark rule, 
which in this example is the Taylor rule. 
 
The size of the interest rate responses in policy rules matter greatly for economic 
performance. Changing the interest rate by more than one for one with inflation is a 
crucial property of a good monetary policy rule. A response that is smaller than one-to-
one can result in very poor performance. An example of this is the USA’s response of the 
interest rate to inflation in the late 1960s and the 1970s in comparison with the 1980s and 
1990s.  
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 Another important advantage of having a monetary policy rule is that it increases the 
transparency of monetary policy. Financial market analysts frequently use monetary 
policy rules to figure out what central banks are going to do. Whether the rule is good or 
bad, they use monetary policy rules to help predict the short term interest rate. Such a 
predication is also useful for analyzing exchange rates, bond prices, or stock prices. 
 
The following consideration determines the choice between a policy rule with the interest 
rate as the instrument and a policy rule with the money base (or some other monetary 
aggregate) as the instrument. If there is too much uncertainty in measuring the real 
interest rate or if there are relatively big shocks to investment or net exports, then a 
monetary aggregate is the preferred instrument. The same is true if it is difficult to 
measure the equilibrium real interest rate. But if velocity shocks are big, then the interest 
rate is the more suited instrument. 
 
The preference for the interest rate instrument in recent works on policy rules primarily 
reflects velocity uncertainty. But there are circumstances where real interest rate 
measurement is difficult and where the over night nominal interest rate is not the best 
guide. Such cases may very well be present in transition economies. In a situation of a 
high growth rate and/or a high inflation rate, the real interest rate is hard to measure and 
the risk premia can be high and variable, e.g. due to the presence of political uncertainty. 
With an interest rate rule, uncertainty about the equilibrium real interest rate translates 
into policy errors. Policy makers in transition economies might want to give greater 
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consideration to policy rules with monetary aggregates, even if rules with the interest rate 
become the preferred choice. 
 
Just because monetary policy rules can be written down as a mechanical-looking 
equation, this does not imply that central banks should follow them mechanically. To the 
contrary, most proposals for monetary policy rules suggest that the rules are best used as 
guidelines, or general policy frameworks. Discretion is needed to implement the policy 
rule. 
 
The Taylor rule [Taylor (1993)] suggests a very specific policy for the central bank. It 
calls for the quarterly average US interest rate to rise by 1.5 times any increase in the 
four-quarter average inflation rate plus 0.5 times any increase in the output gap. Even so, 
the Taylor rule is a guideline for assessing interest rate decisions. Discretion is needed to 
assess monthly data on commodity prices, employment, industrial output and other 
variables, in order to estimate or predict the current quarterly inflation rate and the output 
gap. 
 
3. Inflation Targeting 
 
Having an inflation target is essential for good monetary policy making in cases where a 
country decides on a flexible exchange rate regime. The inflation target places the 
nominal anchor on domestic prices. In this it contrasts with a fixed exchange rate regime, 
a currency board, or dollarization. The increased focus on the inflation target in transition 
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economies is a welcome development. By the target rate of inflation we mean the value 
level of inflation that one would like to be the one that the actual inflation rate fluctuates 
around. The following table provides an impression of the inflation targets of some 
countries that operate an inflation targeting regime 
 
Country Inflation target Target’s horizon 
   
Australia 2% to 3% (since 1993) Medium term 
Brazil 5.1% (for 2005) 1 year 
Canada 1% to 3% (since 1998)  Medium term 
Chile 2% to 4% (since 2001) Medium term 
Colombia 3.5% to 4.5% (for 2007) Medium term 
Czech Republic 2% to 4% (since 2005) 1 year 
Mexico 2% to 4% (since 2004) Medium term 
Norway 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2001) Medium term 
Peru 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2002) Medium term 
Philippines 4% to 5% (for 2006) 1 year 
Poland 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2004) Medium term 
Sweden  1% to 3% (since 1995) Medium term 
United Kingdom 2% (since 2004) Medium term 
 
Source: various sources 
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Having a target for the inflation rate is not enough. There are many different policies and 
instruments that will achieve an inflation target over the long run. Some policies will 
involve much larger fluctuations in other variables of concern to policy makers, such as 
the exchange rate or the real output. Thus, choosing an inflation target still leaves open 
most of the important questions about monetary policy decisions. That is where a 
monetary policy rule comes in. It provides the details about how the inflation target is to 
be met. 
 
A good monetary policy rule is one in which the fluctuations of actual inflation around 
the inflation target rate are small. There can also be targets of other variables, as long as 
they are not inconsistent with the inflation target in the long run. For output, the target 
must be the natural rate of output. For the exchange rate, the target for appreciation or 
depreciation must be the difference between the domestic target inflation rate and the 
average inflation rate of other countries. Once such consistent long-run targets are set, 
then there is a variance trade-off between keeping small the fluctuations around the 
inflation target and the fluctuations around other targets [Taylor (1979)]. The variance 
trade-off replaces the old Phillips curve trade-off. 
 
“But alas, inflation targeting does not guarantee that a central bank 
practising it will be able to deliver consistently low inflation. All the debates 
about how to formulate monetary policy in order to deliver the best 
outcomes are still relevant. Should we use monetary aggregates? Should we 
use Taylor rules? Should we simply adjust interest rates so that the direct 
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price effects of the change in the exchange rate produce the desired effect on 
the domestic price level?” [D. Brash (1999), pp. 43 - 44] 
 
There is no inconsistency between using inflation targeting as the objective and using a 
monetary aggregate as the instrument in the policy rule. In fact, because of the difficulties 
with the interest rate as an instrument in some transition economies, the money base may 
be a better instrument for achieving the inflation target. In earlier work on policy rule 
evaluation with an inflation target the money supply is the instrument [Taylor (1979)]. 
Inflation targeting is an alternative to fixed or managed exchange rates, not to policies 
that focus on the monetary aggregates. 
 
Inflation forecast targeting means that the central bank chooses the instruments of policy 
so as to bring a forecast of inflation into equality with the inflation target at some future 
date. An example of inflation forecast targeting is the Monetary Policy Committee of the 
Bank of England, which describe their policy operations this way. Inflation forecast 
targeting, however, does not necessarily achieve well in obtaining an inflation target. 
 
Inflation forecast targeting as defined here may be difficult in transition economies. The 
alternative to inflation targeting is simply to use a monetary policy rule. But inflation 
forecasts can be used in monetary policy rules in place of actual observed inflation 
values, such rules are called inflation forecast based policy rules [Batini and Haldane 
(1999); Rudebusch and Svensson (2000)]. 
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In reality, any policy rule will involve some forecasts of inflation. The rule states policy 
should react to the current quarter, but data on the current quarter are not tabulated until 
after the quarter, so at least one-quarter forecasts are needed. Batini and Haldane (1999) 
showed that the optimal horizon – if one does not include output in the rule – is about 
three or four quarters. 
 
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) have shown how the expectations effects of policy 
rules can greatly reduce the likelihood of getting into deep recessions. Such expectations 
effects are present in any monetary policy in which changes in the instruments depend on 
future events.  
 
Woodford (1999, 2004) shows that these expectations effects indicate that the response of 
the interest variables has a lot of inertia. Inertia is created by slowly adjusting interest rate 
instruments to changes in the economy. The inertia actually increases the size of the 
response of variables that are forward looking such as long term bonds.  
 
How should transition economies without highly liquid longer maturity markets view 
these results? They must not think that they can have a less clearly stated policy that will 
work better. Even if financial markets are not fully developed and there are few long term 
securities, movements in the exchange rate, the price of land, and even wages are affected 
by expectations of the future. It will be easier for the private sector to form expectations 
if the central bank is clear in its intentions through some kind of policy rule. 
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However, without long term markets, it may be wise to react more quickly and by a 
larger amount because the shorter term interest rates will have to do more of the work. 
This suggests that “optimal” monetary policy rules in transition economies should be 
more responsive than optimal policy rules in more developed economies. 
 
The exchange rate is part of the transmission mechanism in many of the models used for 
policy evaluation. The exchange rate enters both in the determination of net exports and 
in equations describing how the prices of foreign goods are passed through to domestic 
prices. And there is a link between the exchange rate and the interest rate through capital 
markets. It should be noted, however, that the models that have been used for policy 
evaluation assume perfect capital mobility. 
 
The policy evaluation research that helped design the Taylor rule considered the role of 
the exchange rate. Simulations of multi-country models led to the belief that if the central 
bank reacted too strongly to the exchange rate, then inflation-output performance would 
deteriorate. However, the same conclusion would not necessarily be reached for small 
open transition economies. A country’s size, openness, capital mobility, and degree of 
exchange market development would matter as well [Ball (1999); Svensson (1999); 
Batini, Harrison and Millard (2001)]. 
 
Evidence suggests that simple policy rules that focus on a smoothed inflation measure 
and real output and do not try to react too much to the exchange rate might actually work 
well in transition economies. However, the current models may understate the exchange 
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rate effects in small open economies and therefore tend to underestimate the costs of 
exchange rate fluctuations which may be very high in transition economies where there is 
a mismatch of assets by currency or duration. The forward-looking nature of the 
exchange rate suggests that there may be significant gains from policies that utilize 
rational expectations in the same way that inertial rules for the interest rate do in closed 
economy models [Woodford (1999, 2004)]. 
 
4. Political Risk and Ambiguity 
 
As opposed to ordinary risks, some of the risks faced by financial markets fail to be 
calculable. Such non-calculable risks are referred to as instances of ambiguity. This 
distinction between calculable risk in and non-calculable ambiguity was already made by 
Knight [Knight (1921)] and ambiguity, therefore, is sometimes referred to as Knightian 
uncertainty. 
 
Regarding the impact of the amount of ambiguity – and its counterpart: the level of 
confidence – on interest rates Keynes (1937, p. 116) observes: 
 
“... partly on reasonable grounds and partly on instinctive grounds, our 
desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our 
distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future. ... 
... the quantity of hoards can [...] be altered [...] if the total quantity of 
current money income [...] is changed; whereas fluctuations in the degree of 
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confidence are capable of having quite a different effect, namely, in 
modifying [...]  the amount of premium which has to be offered to induce 
people not to hoard.” 
 
Political risk is a prominent form of ambiguity in the context of monetary policy and has 
a significant impact on investor confidence. Non-calculable political risk is much more 
prominent in transition economies than in the developed economies. Its presence leads to 
an ambiguity premium on the real interest rate. When investors are pessimistic, i.e. 
ambiguity averse, this premium is positive as in the case of the normal risk premium. In 
the case investors are optimistic, i.e. ambiguity loving, the ambiguity premium will be 
negative. Thus, the ambiguity premium supplements the usual risk premium [Spanjers 
(1999)]. 
 
The ambiguity premium is likely to be more volatile than the risk premium, as the level 
of non-calculable political risk is subject to rapid and violent fluctuations, even if the 
fundamentals of the economy remain unchanged. The added presence of the ambiguity 
premium makes the nominal interest rate even less suited as a policy instrument for 
transition economies than the discussion in Section 2 indicates.  
 
The impact of ambiguity on the instruments of monetary policy is not restricted to the 
interest rate. The ambiguity premium incorporated in the exchange rate of transition 
economies is even more sensitive to unexpected political events and loss of confidence. 
As is argued in Spanjers (2005) two different types of loss of confidence – and therefore 
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two different sources for changes in the ambiguity premium – can be identified. The first 
is an exogenous loss of confidence as can be observed after an unexpected political event, 
e.g. the fall of a government or the events in the wake of the “Orange Revolution” in the 
Ukraine. The second is an endogenous loss of confidence as it may be observed after a 
plausible political event occurs, the likelihood of which was at best vaguely known. 
 
Keynes (1937, pp. 114 – 115) highlights that decisions which are made in the presence of 
ambiguity are vulnerable to sudden violent changes:  
 
“Now a practical theory of the future [...] has certain marked characteristics. 
In particular, being based on so flimsy a foundation, it is subject to sudden 
and violent changes. The practice of calmness and immobility, of certainty 
and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without 
warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may 
suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation. All these pretty, 
polite techniques, made for a well-panelled board room and a nicely 
regulated market, are liable to collapse. At all times vague panic fears and 
equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really lulled, and lie but a little 
way below the surface.” 
 
In our opinion, both ambiguity and sudden violent changes in investor behaviour are 
leading characteristics in many currency crises and in the 1997 East-Asian crisis in 
particular. Therefore, we take a closer look at Keynes’ intuition regarding ambiguity and 
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its consequences before discussing the potential impact of ambiguity on monetary policy 
rules. 
 
Economists in his days, Keynes (1937, pp. 112 - 113) notes, were reluctant to consider 
uncertainty. If they considered uncertainty at all – be it in the form of expectations or 
otherwise – they only focus on calculable risk. The use of this approach of subjective 
expected utility and rational expectations, is, in Keynes’ view, based on an inappropriate 
model of decision making. He considers this model particularly inappropriate when 
decisions regarding “wealth” and “wealth accumulation” are concerned. Such decisions 
are particularly prone to the impact of non-calculable risks and, therefore, cannot be 
adequately justified by the use of subjective expected utility. 
 
From here, he proceeds to the next natural question: how are appropriately founded 
decisions made in an environment that displays a certain amount of non-calculable risk? 
His answer is that what decision makers do in the presence of ambiguity is to ignore it as 
good as they can, hoping that the current state of opinion in the market is a more or less 
fair summary of the future perspectives: 
 
“[...] Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as 
practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave 
exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a 
series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by the 
appropriate probability, waiting to be summed.” [Keynes (1937), p. 114] 
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 It is only when “something new and relevant comes into the picture” that the existing 
state of opinion is no longer accepted as a fair and useful summary of future perspectives: 
 
“How do we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which 
saves our faces as rational, economic men? We have devised for the purpose 
a variety of techniques, of which much the most important are the three 
following: 
(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the 
future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to 
have been hitherto. In other words we largely ignore the prospect of 
future changes about the actual character of which we know nothing. 
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and 
the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of 
future prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and until 
something new and relevant comes into the picture. 
(3) Knowing that our own individual judgement is worthless, we endeavour 
to fall back on the judgement of the rest of the world which is perhaps 
better informed. That is, we endeavour to conform with the behaviour of 
the majority or the average. The psychology of a society of individuals 
each of whom is endeavouring to copy the others leads to what we may 
strictly term a conventional judgement.” [Keynes (1937), p. 114]4 
 
                                                 
4 Italics added. 
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In Keynes’ view this leads to severe consequences of relatively small changes in what 
would be considered only marginally relevant areas. This applies when considering the 
ambiguity premium in interest rates or in the case of currency crises.  
 
Next, Keynes shifts his focus on economic theory and economic theorists who, in his 
view (in 1937) were slow to duly recognize the relevance of ambiguity and to incorporate 
it in their thinking accordingly: 
 
“Perhaps the reader feels that this general, philosophical disquisition on the 
behaviour of mankind is somewhat remote from the economic theory under 
discussion. But I think not. [...] I accuse the classical economic theory of 
being itself one of those pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the 
present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the 
future. 
I daresay that a classical economist would readily admit this. But, even so, I 
think he has overlooked the precise nature of the difference which his 
abstraction makes between theory and practice, and the character of the 
fallacies into which he is likely to be led.” [Keynes (1937), p. 115] 
 
Various kinds of adverse changes in the premium for ambiguity of assets in transition 
economies may cause currency crises, loss of confidence being the most prominent 
among them. Both the interest rate and the exchange rate are vulnerable to changes in 
non-calculable political risk, leading to increased volatility and to difficulties in 
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measuring their equilibrium levels. This reinforces the conclusion in Section 3 above, that 
the optimal targets for transition economies may be inflation and output, with a monetary 
aggregate – e.g. the money base – as the optimal policy instrument. 
 
5. Monetary Policy and Ambiguity 
 
The above discussion of political risk and ambiguity raises the broader question how 
ambiguity affects the outcomes of monetary policy. Here the focus is on the effects of 
ambiguity regarding either the specific reactions triggered by the monetary policy or the 
predictability of central bank behaviour. Wagner (2005) observes that in the modern 
literature three different sources of uncertainty are analyzed: 
1. Uncertainty regarding the current state of the economy, caused by the lags with 
which data become available. (Data uncertainty) 
2. Uncertainty regarding the structure and the functioning of the economy. (Model 
uncertainty and parameter uncertainty) 
3. Uncertainty regarding the interaction between the central bank and the public. 
(Strategic uncertainty) 
 
The analysis of these forms of uncertainty typically takes place in Bayesian models, 
where the risks are perfectly calculable. If, however, the uncertainty is considered to have 
a significant non-calculable component, specific methods for modeling ambiguity are 
required. But even if model-builders are willing to include ambiguity in their models, 
they face a seemingly impossible task: how to make the non-calculable calculable?  
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 This problem was solved by Schmeidler (1982/89) and Gilboa (1987) who extended the 
axiomatic approach of the subjective expected utility theory. It is based on the 
assumption that decision makers, even if they face non-calculable risks, can still express 
a clear preference when facing two alternatives. That is, they can state either which 
alternative they prefer or that they are indifferent between the two. If such preferences 
satisfy certain properties similar to – but slightly weaker than – those of the subjective 
expected utility theory, then these preferences can be represented by the generalized 
expected utility of the outcomes that follow a non-additive probability measure as 
obtained by applying the Choquet integral. In situations in which no preferences as 
required in this approach are given, there is no obvious way to make the non-calculable 
calculable. 
 
Therefore, in the setting where a central bank faces data uncertainty, model uncertainty or 
parameter uncertainty, more or less sophisticated versions of sensitivity analysis are the 
only options available. This is the approach which is effectively taken in the literature on 
robust control in monetary policy [Svensson (2000)]. Even if some of the formulations 
are similar to those of models that deal with ambiguity, the parallel is misleading. In the 
end, questions regarding the appropriate trade-off of the consequences of ambiguity 
against other relevant aspects cannot be solved within the model. The trade-off remains 
fully at the discretion of the policy maker. 
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The situation is different when the public faces strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty 
affects the functioning of the economy through the expectations of the decision makers, 
e.g. the central bank and the public. These expectations are formed much in line with 
Keynes’ observations as cited above. In principle, it is possible to extract this information 
regarding the perceived amount of ambiguity and the prevailing attitudes towards it and 
to include them in the model. If now, for one reason or another, the amount of ambiguity 
and/or the attitudes towards it change, it would be possible to predict the effects on the 
monetary policy outcomes. As opposed to the literature on robust control, the latter strand 
of literature is still in its infancy [see Caglianrini and Heath (2000), Chprits and Schipper 
(2003) and Spanjers (2007)]. 
 
In Spanjers (2007) the interaction between a central bank and the public is analyzed in a 
standard setting where both the central bank and the public face ambiguity. The public 
faces ambiguity regarding the trustworthiness of the central bank, whereas the central 
bank faces ambiguity regarding the effectiveness of surprise inflation. When both the 
public and the central bank are pessimistic, it is found that under inflation targeting the 
equilibrium level of inflation is higher than it would have been in the absence of 
ambiguity. 
 
Future research on monetary policy rules in transition countries, faces the challenging 
and interesting question which monetary policy rules are most suited when economies 
face specific kinds of ambiguity. How will the source of ambiguity influence the optimal 
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monetary policy rule? How are the results affected when the ambiguity affects different 
decision makers: the central bank, the domestic public and foreign investors? 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The most certain thing in the world is uncertainty. In the presence of random shocks, 
liquidity crises and the loss of confidence or reputation, uncertainty matters. But how 
should it be modeled and understood? Should we use Bayesian methods for estimating 
Demand/Supply General Equilibrium Models? Should we use flexible priors or perhaps 
even modern methods for modeling ambiguity? For transition economies, a further 
question that arises is: how do we model the role of uncertainty and ambiguity in 
formulating expectations in the context of monetary policy rules? And regarding the issue 
of commitment in a timeless perspective: can we be confident that the time inconsistency 
problem can be solved in a satisfactory way? 
 
At the moment, the trinity of a flexible exchange rate, an inflation target and a monetary 
policy rule still stands tall in transition economies and a modified Taylor rule could be an 
important pillar. It would seem a sensible idea to perform a welfare analysis using a 
linear quadratic approach to derive optimal monetary policy rules. Another idea would be 
to use a foreign currency premium to minimize risk. Or one could devise models to 
analyze the impact of foreign interest shocks. In each of these cases, though, a Bayesian 
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